tAbstract In the SQoS network as introduced in 111 and 121, the border router in every autonomous system (AS) provides customized security mechanisms to the incoming packets. Some serious problems have been recently raised particularly when there are one or more compromised routers that attempt to modify, delete, or fabricate any part or the whole packet into the SQoS network. The compromised router can either passively or actively perform the malicious activities against the forwarding packets. The SQoS network does not explicitly specify the method to detect whether the data contained in the packets have been tampered by the compromised routers or by the end host itself. We deliberate the threats and propose several methods to detect both the malicious routers and end hosts such that SQoS information and payload are authentic and integrity-protected.
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I. INTRODUCTION The compromised router can maliciously conduct the following attacks against the packets: firstly, the passive attacks in which the compromised router can inspect, delay, or relay the packets to the third party; secondly, the active attack in which information can be modified or the packets can be injected into or deleted from the networks by the compromised routers as well as in which the compromised routers attempt to impersonate the other nodes in order to mislead or conceal their malicious behaviors.
The routers in the SQoS network provide several customized security mechanisms to the packets in an AS-to-AS manner, implying that only the edge routers execute the requested services. Apparently, the routers must be examined whether they follow appropriate procedures correctly.
In this paper, we present the problem statements in Section II, followed by the proposed solutions to the problems in Section III. We present the conclusions and discuss future works in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
In this paper, we focus on detecting malicious routers and assuring the end hosts that data payload is safeguarded and the requested security services will be properly executed in the SQoS network. We separate the SQoS network into two environments: inter-autonomous system environment and intra-autonomous system environment. The intra-autonomous system environment creates a virtual tunnel between two edge routers. The two edge routers encrypt and decrypt the packets twith its pair-wise symmetric key. The inter-autonomous system environment has a virtual end-to-end path from the sending end host to the receiving end host, and this path consists of passways. A passway is defined as the link between the two border routers of two adjacent autonomous systems. These environments can be illustrated in Fig. 1 . The virtual edge-to-edge path means that the forwarding of the packet inside the AS on the edge-to-edge path is transparent to the forwarding on the end-to-end path. The implementation is to copy the IP header, encrypt the packet with a pair-wise symmetric key of the two edge routers, and concatenate the copied IP header at the front of the encrypted packet. When the packet reaches the other edge router, the copied IP header is stripped off and the encrypted packet is decrypted with the key. We use the concept of virtual edge-toedge path to mitigate the threats, and it will be further discussed in Section III.
In this section we list the processes in SQoS that may be vulnerable to attacks, and illustrate the possible threats from both the misbehaved routers and malicious end hosts. The threats basically dampen the following major characteristics of traffic: validity of SQoS 4. In the SQoS network, the routers are not necessarily required to keep SQoS information of all SQoS-aware traffics due to a limited storage. Instead, the router tags the preference into the probing packet so that the following data packets can be appropriately forwarded based on this preference. The preference is given depending on the customer profile marked by the SSLA number in the SQoS header [1] (for different class traffics) and arrival time in a first-come-first-serve manner (for the same class traffics). Upon receipt of the probing packet, the SQoS-capable router compares its SSLA number with the customer profile from the SSLA database for the customer's authorization. The preference is assigned based on a "preference timeout", and other SQoS information, which includes the customer profile and requested services. The router signs it with its private key. This signature is concatenated following the aSSV in the probing packet. When the associated data packet arrives with the corresponding requested-SSV and preference information, the services are then scheduled to be served accordingly. If the associated data packets arrive after the preference timeout expired, the router can reassign the packets with a lower preference, but within the same class. Since routers at the AWAY ASes do not maintain the SSLA database and the SSLA number in the SQoS header can be spoofed, preference information from the HOME AS's router is used by those routers at the AWAY ASes to verify the class of traffic without knowledge ofwthe actual customer profile.
5. Since the end-to-end path might be routed through many management policies and are using different network protocols, an accurate transition of the requested services between adjacent systems should be carefully designed. In the existing QoS-enabled networks, the autonomous systems can communicate and exchange policies and QoS information between their central server's SSP databases via several existing inter-AS routing and signaling protocols, such as RSVP [3] and IP/MPLS interautonomous system traffic engineering protocol [4] . Thus, the AWAY AS's routers can execute the requested services with the same procedures as the HOME AS's router does. 3) The case that one of the requested security service is indeed a request to have a check on its packet at all times. * The end host may require in SSLA the checking on all of its packets at every router. 4) The case that it is a routine for the router to report the router status to the administrator. * The router reports to the administrator about its status periodically. However, this may not be necessarily due to a huge overhead and can be skipped. There are two scenarios that the requested services are denied: one with the HOME AS's router and the other with the AWAY AS's router. The end host complains to its HOME AS's administrator who will investigate and conclude (in the first scenario), or it relays the complaint to the target AWAY AS's administrator (in the second scenario). The AWAY AS's administrator requests a report from the router, verifies if the target router is acting maliciously, and returns the result to the HOME AS's administrator.
One way to detect malicious routers and to protect the packet from any packet attacks (such as packet dropped, fabricated, deleted, modified, and impersonated) is to check a fingerprint (snapshot) of the packet. However, this will incur huge communications overhead. An alternative way is to take the snapshot of several small portions from the packet.
Let L be the packet length (in byes). It is divided into N portions, each LIN bytes. The size of each portion corresponds to the size of a block in the hash function used in the X.509 public key infrastructure (PKI). Padding may be added to fill up the last portion. The router takes a snapshot of the portions at random, each tagged with a portion number. Since the whole packet is not recorded, there is a probability that the modified portion has not been captured. To fix this problem, the router must capture the portions such that they are at least "k-portions distant" away from each other. IfX portions are to be captured, the communications overhead is XLIN bytes per AS, and if there are Y autonomous systems on the end-to-end path, the communications overhead is as small as XYLIN bytes.
When the router takes the snapshot of the portions of the packet, it hashes these portions along with the SQoS information and signs with its private key. In addition, the following parameters should also be recorded: time when the packet arrived at an incoming link and time when the packet is delivered onto an outgoing link. This signature is put together with the aSSV portion, and the end host stores this signature but cannot decrypt it because of the unknown public key. As depicted in Fig. 2 , in the dispute case, the end host in AS1 reports this signature to the administrator. Ifthe target router is within the same AS1, the administrator can reveal information with the router's public key because the key is known. If the target router is outside ASI, says in AS5, the ASI's administrator can retrieve that router's public key from the AS5's administrator. Although the malicious end host may also retrieve the public key from the compromised router but it cannot modify and escape the detection because it does not have the private key. Similarly, if the end host alters the preference information (in the probing packet), it will be detected since the preference information is encrypted with the router's private key and the malicious end host knows only the public key.
To mitigate the threats when the router fails to recognize the requested service, there is a need to investigate whether the requested service is invalid; whether it is not available at the HOME AS; or whether the requested service is available at the HOME AS's central SSP database, but the router fails to update its SSP database. The AWAY AS's administrator signs the request with its private key and sends via SBGP to the HOME AS's administrator. The request is decrypted with the AWAY AS's public key that can be obtained from the CA to which both HOME AS and AWAY AS are registered (based on S-BGP's PKI [6] ). The HOME AS's administrator examines its central server's SSP database, signs the result with its private key, and replies to the AWAY AS's administrator. Similarly, the AWAY AS's administrator decrypts it with the HOME AS's public key obtained from the CA.
The third solution is to have the AS's administrator randomly checks its routers if they regularly update the SSP database (for all ASes) and the SSLA database (for the HOME AS). When the router sends an update request via an SNMP message to the central server, it signs the request with its private key. The request is decrypted with the router's public key by the central server. This public key can be obtained from the CA (in this case, the administrator) to which both the router and central server are registered. After checking the authentication and authorization of the router and message, the server returns only the changed, signs the result with its private key, and replies to the router. Similarly, the router decrypts it with the server's public key obtained from the CA. The router replies with a response message acknowledging the update.
The simple solution to the threat due to the replay attack is for the router to encrypt timings when the router receives the the preference timeout (in the probing packet) is already required to be put into the router's signature, so the replay attack is easily mitigated. The signature is encrypted with the router's private key such that no one can modify this timeout and escape the detection from the router. If the attacker attacks by using the replay of data packets, the router can compare their corresponding preference timeouts with timings recorded, and drop the replayed packets accordingly. However, the router may be vulnerable when the information recorded is overwritten. Further investigation in this possible threat might be needed.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We have deliberated the threats that have been recently raised for the SQoS network. Several solutions have been proposed to countermeasure these threats. Our solutions provide information assurance in various aspects: authentication, authorization, access control, integrity, and confidentiality.
However, our solutions are based upon the fact that only certificate authorities are trustworthy. Thus, a problem can be raised if there is an untrustworthy administrator because the administrator is the CA in some cases. We believe that some solutions can be introduced to mitigate the effect, but they might not eliminate this threat entirely. This paper focuses on the threats that occur in the inter-autonomous system environment. The work to detect the malicious routers in the intra-autonomous system is in progress and will be reported in the future.
